As promised at the end of my last post, this post explores a question which has plagued philosophers of metaphysics for millenia: can an action be demonstrably and infallibly foreknowable, and yet free? Although there are mountains of highly technical literature on this and related questions—with infinitely debatable minutiae (and this question’s own camps of more esoteric compatibilists and incompatibilists)—I will be providing a much less formal response to the question. For that reason, I will be trying to explain much of the typical philosophical jargon I use with common, everyday expressions. In the interest of this clarity, I would like to note that any use of the words ‘compatibilism’ and ‘incompatibilism’ below refer strictly to the sense in which they were used last week, concerning determinism and free will (rather than concerning infallible foreknowledge and free will).
By presenting my own account of an answer to this question in this way, I hope to accomplish two things. First, I have been told that my articles, which are intended for accessibility, have remained difficult for readers who are truly new to philosophy; I hope that the ideas seem more accessible in this format, and thus interested readers will be able to pursue the aforementioned mountains of literature at a later date. Second, I hope to help further clarify my perceptual model of free will sketched briefly in the prior post, and to come at my notion of the ‘inescapable practical illusion of free will’ from another angle.
The Foreseeable Future: