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G.E. Moore Sketch by M.R.P. - criticism - radical skepticism, common sense, Moorean shift, Moorean facts

Caricature Sketch by M.R.P.

Introduction:

Although there are several voices that shine the brightest as philosophers of philosophical skepticism, it is a topic which has captured the attention of a huge number of philosophers throughout time. The so-called challenge of radical skepticism has been raised and allegedly met time and time again. One of the aforementioned notable voices in the past century was G.E. Moore, who advocated what he and others have termed a ‘common sense’ response to radical skepticism (where radical skepticism refers to the position that knowledge—or certainly knowledge of the external world—is impossible).

Formally, Moore’s response proceeds from what is now in certain contexts called a Moorean shift—changing a modus ponens argument’s second premise to create a modus tollens argument which has an opposing conclusion—to support what is now in certain contexts called a Moorean fact. Those argument types will be explained below. And that naming scheme (i.e. Moorean shift, Moorean fact) ought to tell you how influential these ideas have been. G.E. Moore was a capable and perceptive philosopher, and his work on skepticism was inspirational for Ludwig Wittgenstein (who later tried to create a rigorous account of Moore’s approach in notes which were assembled into a book after Wittgenstein’s death). Now I will point out why G.E. Moore’s confident argument is insufficient for meeting the challenge of radical skepticism.

[Topics: Epistemology, Moorean Shift, Skepticism]

Intuition All Alone:

On G.E. Moore’s Tempting but Insufficient Answer to Radical Skepticism

was last modified: October 3rd, 2024 by Daniel Podgorski

Introduction:

“Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills” (Schopenhauer 531).

Attentive readers of last week’s post in this series will have noted that its discussion of meaning, while relevant to the meaningfulness of moral action, is more broadly applicable to all philosophical discussions of meaning. Using that article as a transitional moment, I will now move away from discussing moral action directly and, at least for a time, toward discussing human action more generally.

One of the most persistent debates across the history of philosophy, when it comes to human behavior and morality, is that of whether determinism or free will is true. But in order to get at that debate, I will instead today be confronting an intimately related debate of roughly equal age, that of whether determinism and free will are compatible or not. Many laypeople are casual incompatibilists, and would be quick to dismiss this latter debate as so much sophistry, feeling that determinism and free will are intractable opposites. But various different versions of compatibilism have had some strong defenders over the years, including Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Peter Strawson, and the majority of professional philosophers in the world today. So what is compatibilism, and how does it respond to incompatibilism?

Tag Archives: phenomenology

[Topics: Epistemology, Moorean Shift, Skepticism]
Intuition All Alone:
On G.E. Moore’s Tempting but Insufficient Answer to Radical Skepticism

On G.E. Moore’s Tempting but Insufficient Answer to Radical Skepticism

Introduction:

On G.E. Moore’s Tempting but Insufficient Answer to Radical Skepticism

[Topics: Compatibilism, Determinism, Free Will, Philosophy of Language]
Free Will Twice Defined:
On the Linguistic Conflict of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism

On the Linguistic Conflict of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism

Introduction:

On the Linguistic Conflict of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism

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