[Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Skepticism]
Superknowledge and Casual-knowledge:

Discussing the Fallacies Involved in One Minor Argument Against Radical Skepticism

 

Introduction:

Bertrand Russell Sketch by M.R.P. - radical skepticism - superknowledge

Sketch by M.R.P.

Many of your Friday Phil articles thus far have provided overviews and general clarifications. In contrast to that style, this week I will be briefly taking up and criticizing a very specific argument, as I have enjoyed doing on just one or two previous occasions. For today’s article, the argument under study is one that is intended to support the extant refutations of radical skepticism (where radical skepticism refers to the position that knowledge—or certainly knowledge of the external world—is impossible).

The argument in question, which is only meant to lend support to more rigorous arguments against such skepticism, could be called something like ‘the argument from common practice’ or ‘the superknowledge argument.’ Its aim is to show that certainty is not required for knowledge by showing that multiple related but distinct concepts are all being called ‘knowledge.’ I intend to showcase where this argument goes wrong in two ways, first through its propensity for special pleading and then through its rhetorical strategy.

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[Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Skepticism]
Superknowledge and Casual-knowledge:

Discussing the Fallacies Involved in One Minor Argument Against Radical Skepticism

was last modified: October 10th, 2022 by Daniel Podgorski